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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This Appeal involves the interpretation of the applicable
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("Malpractice
Act"), found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 et seq. (1992) and
(Supp. 1994).

Section 78-14-3 (Supp. 1994), provides in relevant

part:
(10) "Health Care" means any act of treatment
performed or furnished, or which should have been
performed or furnished, by any health care provider
for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's
medical care, treatment, or confinement.
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person,
partnership, association, corporation, or other
facility or institution who causes to be rendered or
who renders health care or professional services as a
hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental
hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory
technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist,
podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician,
naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician,
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speechlanguage pathologist, clinical social worker, certified
social worker, social service worker, marriage and
family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others
rendering similar care and services relating to or
arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any of
the above acting in the course and scope of their
employment.
Other provisions of the Malpractice Act are considered in
the analysis and statutory interpretation below.

Additionally,

Utah Code Ann. Titles 58 and 62A are also considered generally in
conjunction with the Malpractice Act.

1

ARGUMENT
The trial court made only one finding and conclusion when it
ruled on the Defendants' (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"PHP") motion for summary judgement.

The trial court limited its

ruling on the motion to its conclusion that PHP were health care
providers within the meaning of that term in Utah Code Ann. § 7814-3 , "thereby depriving [the] court of subject matter
jurisdiction."

R. 1557-58, 1569.

The trial court made no other

findings or conclusions regarding summary judgment.

The issues

before this Court are therefore limited to whether the trial
court in fact lacked jurisdiction to hear any of the claims
brought by the plaintiff ("Platts") based upon its conclusion
that PHP were health care providers, and whether the trial court
erred in requiring Platts to pay the cost of a transcript of the
summary judgment hearing.
PHP claims that this Court should, as a matter of law, find
that PHP and its employees are health care providers within the
meaning of that term in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the
"Act"), set out in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 et. seq..

PHP also

claims that such a finding precludes Platts1 claims because
Platts failed to meet the procedural requirement of providing a
Notice of intent to commence action against such a health care
provider under § 78-14-8.
PHP purports to support its claims by arguing in conclusory
fashion that PHP and its employees "certainly" render health care
or professional services and that they are health care providers
2

under the language "or others rendering similar care and services
relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or
groups of persons," found in § 78-14-3(11).
at 22-23.

Brief of Appellees

PHP cites to its representation that its "on staff"

"clinical director" is a licensed clinical social worker and that
PHP itself is licensed by the State of Utah.

JdL. at 22-24.

PHP's analysis and statutory interpretation of the Act, however,
is not helpful and is severely flawed.
I.

APPELLEES' ARGUMENTS FAIL BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
MALPRACTICE ACT, AS WELL AS THE STATED INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE SHOW THAT PUP ANP IT? EMPLOYEES AfiE NOT HSftl/TH
CARE PROVIDERS
When construing a statute, this Court "must give effect to

legislative intent."

Versluis v. Guaranty Nat. Companies, 842

P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992).

The best evidence of legislative

intent is the plain language of the statute.

Sullivan v. Scoular

Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993).

If doubt or

uncertainly exists when interpreting the meaning or application
of a statute, "the court should analyze the act in its entirety
and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative
intent and purpose./ff

Benyon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 1743, 854

P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993).

"For assistance in ascertaining the

meaning of statutory language, [a court will] look to the
background and general purpose of the statute."
P.2d at 867.

3
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A.
The Malpractice Act was adopted to address the problem
of rising medical malpractice insurance
The Appellee's arguments fail for one important reason.
That is, the Legislature did not intend that programs like PHP
and its counselors be covered by the Malpractice Act.

The plain

language of the statute as well as the stated intent of the
purpose of the Malpractice Act require that there be only one
conclusion.

That is, the Malpractice Act was intended to

encompass hospitals and health care professionals because of the
rising cost of medical malpractice insurance.

Neither PHP, nor

persons acting as "addiction counselors" were not intended to be
encompassed by the act, or fall within its intended purpose.
The Malpractice Act was adopted in 1976, and was adopted
with a preamble stating the "Legislative intent and purpose" of
the statute.

See Laws of Utah, 1976, Chapter 23, section 2. As

passed on January 31, 1976, that preamble states:
The legislature finds and declares that the number of
suits and claims for damages and the amount of
judgments and settlements arising from health care has
increased greatly in recent years. Because of these
increases the insurance industry has substantially
increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance.
The effect of increased insurance premiums and
increased claims is increased health care cost, both
through the health care providers passing the cost of
premiums to the patient and through the provider's
practicing defensive medicine because he views a
patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit.
Further, certain health care providers are discouraged
from continuing to provide services because of the high
cost and possible unavailability of malpractice
insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention
of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends
are producing in the public's health care system, it is
necessary to protect the public interest by enacting
4

measures designed to encourage private insurance
companies to continue to provide health-related
malpractice insurance while at the same time
establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from
private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which
actions may be commenced against health care providers
while limiting that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide
other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation
and settlement of claims.
This preamble also exists in the present version of the Act at §
78-14-2 (1994 Supp.).

The preamble provides assistance in

interpreting the plain language of the Act, as well as providing
some legislative history for assistance with any uncertainty.
It is important to note first that PHP does not carry
malpractice insurance or any type of professional liability
insurance.

Therefore, the very concern of the legislature does

not arise in with entities such as PHP.

As discussed below, PHP

does not employ health care professionals, but instead, only
refers its clients to licensed professionals when needed.
Clients of PHP are responsible for arranging for the payment for
any professional services which they receive as a result of a
referral from PHP.

Those professionals that PHP refers its

clients to certainly may be covered by the language of the Act.
However, PHP and credentialed addiction counselors are not.
The plain language of § 78-14-3, when read with the preamble
clearly requires Platts' proposed interpretation.

An examination

of the Act shows that it was not intended to be construed
5

broadly.

Indeed, it specifically sets out a number of

professions defining them as health care providers.
§ 78-14-3(11) (1994 Supp.) defines "Health care provider" by
setting out a long list of licensed professionals that are
licensed under Title 58 of the Utah Code Ann..
wording of that provision begins:

Additionally, the

,f/

Health care provider'

includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or
other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who
renders health care or professional services as a hospitalf
physician," and the language then continues to list the other
licensed professionals (emphasis added).

Hospital is

specifically defined in subsection (12) as an institution
licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, the Health Care Facility
Licensure and Inspection Act, and is the only type of institution
mentioned in the Malpractice Act.

PHP is not licensed under this

Act, but instead, is licensed under Title 62A as discussed below.
The language which PHP claims brings them within the
Malpractice Act is at the end of § 78-14-3(11) and reads: "or
others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising
out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and
officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in the
course and scope of employment."

It should be noted here that

even though there is a statute, Title 62A, covering "day
treatment" centers and other human services programs, the
Legislature did not refer to that statute or to such programs.
Indeed, as far as institutions go, the only type of institution
6

mentioned anywhere in the Malpractice Act is a "hospital."
Therefore, the language "or others rendering similar care" means
other licensed professionals similar to those in the list.

As

discussed below, only such an interpretation can be harmonized
with other provisions in the Malpractice Act.
The Malpractice Act was not meant to cover every type of
social program, even if it deals with problem adolescents, drug
or alcohol abuse programs or other such programs.
mean that such programs are not important.

That does not

The simple fact is

that the legislature intended to address the problem associated
with malpractice carriers.

PHP type programs and credentialed

addiction counselors were not contemplated by the legislation.
B.
"Harmonizing" the different provisions of the
Malpractice Act clarifies that the Legislature intended the Act
to cover licensed health care professionals and hospitals.
There is arguably some uncertainty in this case regarding
the meaning and application of "health care provider."
"Harmonizing" the other provisions of the Act, however, provides
further support for Platts' proposed interpretation.

For

instance, § 78-14-12 (1992) provides that a prelitigation panel
is to review the malpractice claim following the ninety day
notice.

That provision states in pertinent part at subsection

(4) that the panels are to be composed of:
(b) one member who is licensed under Section 78-14-3f
who is practicing in the same specialty as the proposed
defendant, appointed from a list provided by the
professional association representing the same area of
practice as the health care provider; or in claims
against only hospitals or their employees, one member
who is an individual currently serving in hospital
administration and appointed from a list submitted by
7

the Utah Hospital Association
(emphasis added).

....

In 1994, the legislature rewrote that

provision and subsection (4)(b) now states:
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care
provider listed under Section 78-14-3. who is
practicing and knowledgeable in the same specialty as
the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their
employees, one member who is and individual currently
serving in a hospital administration position directly
related to hospital operations or conduct that includes
responsibility for the area of practice that is the
subject of the liability claim . . . .
(emphasis added).

Therefore, if it is not clear from the list in

§ 78-14-3 itself, it is clear from harmonizing these provisions
that the legislature expected health care providers to be
licensed as a profession like those enumerated in § 78-14-3, or
be employees of a "hospital."

A credentialed addiction counselor

is not a licensed profession and PHP is not any type of hospital
within any meaning of that word.
PHP's argument that it passes as a health care provider
under this licensing theory simply because it is licensed by the
State of Utah fails because many different programs are licensed
by the State and are not health care providers.

PHP claims to be

licensed by the State as a "Day treatment" facility under Utah
Code Ann. §§ 62A-2-101 et. seq..

That section provides for

"Licensure of Programs and Facilities."

That same chapter also

provides for licensing of "Adult day care," "Child day care"
facilities and other social service programs.

§ 62A-2-101.

chapter does not provide for licensing of Hospitals.
8

That

Therefore

the fact that PHP is licensed by the State as a social program,
and not any type of hospital or institution adds further support
that PHP is not a health care provider*
C.
Contrary to PHP's representation to this Court, it does
not employ any licensed professionals: and even if it did, simply
employing a licensed professional would not bring PHP within the
coverage of the Malpractice Act
PHP largely supports its position by relying on its
representation that it had a licensed clinical social worker,
Mary McGee ("McGee"), "on staff" as PHP's "clinical director."
Appellee's Brf. at 23. Even a cursory examination of the record
reveals that McGee was not employed by PHP and that PHP's use of
the word "on staff" means only that PHP referred its clients to
McGee.
In his deposition, defendant Comins was unable to articulate
the exact nature of McGee's relationship with PHP.

It was clear,

however, that she was not employed by PHP and that PHP would
merely refer people to her.

R. at 1085-87 (Comins' deposition).

PHP's reference to McGee as their "clinical director" and that
she was "on staff" is simply a semantic game and misrepresents
her relationship as born out by the record.

PHP apparently

defines anyone as "on staff" who it may refer people to.

Comins

testified to the following in his deposition:
Q:

Do you recall if your clinical director was on staff or

was an employee or was on a contract and just a consultant?
A:

By what you've asked, she didn't receive remuneration

and she signed no papers.
Q:

Signed no papers?
9

A:

Contracts.

Q:

No contracts?

Did Turnabout at any time pay her?

Is

that what you're saying:
A:

That's right.

Q:

So she's not an employee, then?

A:

Not by the definitions that you've given me.

Well, you

want employee to mean she was paid.
R. at 1085. When asked about arrangements with other
professionals, Comins testified that they were by referral.
at 1087.

R.

This evidence directly refutes PHP's claim that McGee

was PHP's clinical director or supervised PHP employees in any
way.

See Appellees' Brf. at 8.
It is very evident from the record that PHP had no licensed

professionals employed by them, but instead, would refer clients
to outside professionals when they felt such services were
needed.

At the very least, there is a factual dispute as to this

question which was created by PHP's own witnesses.

The only

counselors PHP employed were called certified addiction
counselors.

In the Affidavit of Ken Stettler (licensing

specialist with the State of Utah), attached to one of PHP's
memoranda in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr.
Stettler states that the certified addiction counselors at PHP
are not licensed professionals.

R. 1149-50, 1200-01.

They are

not a licensed health care professional and were not intended to
be covered by the Malpractice Act.

10

D.
Changes made to the Malpractice Act show that the
Legislature was well aware of Licensing statutes and
intentionally omitted the human services entities found in Title
62A
PHP claims that under the professional licensing
interpretation proposed by Platts, PHP qualifies as a health care
provider.

The statute covering human services entities, 62A-2-

101 et. seq., was enacted in 1988.
made to § 78-14-3 since then.
(1994 Supp.).

Several changes have been

See Amendment Notes to S 78-14-3

Indeed, the legislature made changes to the Act to

correspond with changes in Title 58, as well as for changes in
Title 26, Chapter 21 of the Health Care Facility Licensure and
Inspection Act.

See Id.

Yet the Legislature made no changes or

additions in § 78-14-3 to correspond with Title 62A.

The

Legislature certainly knew of the Human Services licensing
statute, and the omission of any reference to such programs shows
the Legislature's intent that they not be defined as health care
providers for purposes of the Malpractice Act.

§ 78-14-3 does

not include "Day treatment services" provided for in Utah Code
Ann. § 62A-2-101(6) because the Malpractice Act was adopted for
reasons that have no connection with those programs.

Nothing

from Section 62A-2-101 has been specifically added or provided
for in § 78-14-3 even though § 62A-2-101 has been around for some
time.

11

E.
PHP/s reliance on affidavits from Utah State Agency
employees to support its claim of being a "health care provider"
is misplaced
PHP relies heavily upon the Affidavits of Ken Stettler
("Stettler") and Loretta Garcia ("Garcia").
at 9-12.

See Appellees' Brf.

Stettler is a licensing specialist for the Department

of Human Services, and Garcia is an officer of the Department of
Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
Id.

PHP apparently urges this Court to merely accept the

conclusions of these agency employees.

The affidavits do not

address the legislative intent or history in any way and are
wholly irrelevant to this Court/s determination of the issue at
hand.

As discussed above, Stettler's affidavit actually supports

Platts' proposed application of the Malpractice Act.

Garcia, who

apparently has duties associated with the Prelitigation Panel,
states at the end of her Affidavit:
I have been serving as the Prelitigation Specialist
coordinating this program since October 1987 and during
that time we have had hearings requested on almost
every health care field defined in 78-14-3.
(emphasis added).

Therefore, even Garcia's Affidavit does

nothing but add further support to Platts' view.
The best definition of PHP is its own declared purpose in
its Amended Articles of Incorporation.

That reads:

This Corporation is organized as a non-profit
Corporation to serve the public as a support and selfhelp entity for families and neighborhoods, to serve
the public as a crisis-intervention program,
structuring group meetings to support parents and
spouses in demanding responsible cooperation of out-ofcontrol family members; to acquaint parents and others
with community services available to meet their needs;
to promote education of the public and our membership
12

with respect to alcohol/drug problems and/or behavior
problems.
R. at 1097•

PHP is a self-help center that refers its clients to

professionals for assistance with problems.

It is not a hospital

of any kind and does not employ any licensed professionals.
PHP's supporting memoranda for its motion for summary judgement
and supporting affidavits show as much.
In sum, there is absolutely no indication from the plain
language of the statute, from the legislative history, or from
the other provisions in the Malpractice Act, that PHP, or its
employees are health care providers as defined in § 78-14-3.
Indeed, all such evidence clearly points to the conclusion that
PHP and its employees are not "health care providers" under the
Malpractice Act.

The ninety day notice provision, as well as

other provisions in that Act therefore do not apply to PHP or its
employees.
F.
The Trial Court Made No Other Factual or Legal
Determinations Concerning Summary Judgment and the Proper Remedy
Is To Remand the Case to That Court For Further Proceedings.
As noted at the beginning of the Argument section of this
Reply Brief, the trial court specifically limited its
determination of the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment to
its conclusion that PHP was a health care provider.

Therefore,

the only issues before this Court are whether that determination
was erroneous and whether the trial court erred in Ordering
Platts to provide a transcript of the Hearing on the Motion for
Summary Judgment.

There are absolutely no other findings or

conclusions by the trial court on the Motion for Summary
13

Judgment.

Upon a determination by this Court that PHP is not a

health care provider, this Court should therefore remand this
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion, as well as the
discussion in Platts' opening brief, Platts respectfully requests
that this Court find that PHP and its employees are not "health
care providers" under § 78-14-3, and remand this case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this I I

day of April, 1995
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